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Katherine Beaty Chiste*

Retribution, Restoration, and
White-Collar Crime

A "restorative" approach to criminality and conflict has been proposed in a
number of common law jurisdictions in a variety of legal contexts, both civil and
criminal, with an interesting exception: white-collar crime, which is discussed in an
almost exclusively retributive vocabulary. This paper explores what a specifically
restorative response to white-collar crime might look like, a response which above
all else would seek to heal the harm the crime has done. In particular, the author
looks at the possibilities for voluntary participation of victims and offenders; broad
stakeholder inclusion and a focus on future relations rather than past offences-all
necessary parts of a restorative encounter The author concludes that white-collar
crime, by its nature, lends itself poorly to restoration. Corporate crime, howeverthat in which the corporation rather than the individual can be identified as an
offender -presents a much better fit.

Une approche ,,rsparatrice, de la criminalit6 et des diff6rends a 6 propos~e
dans de nombreux ressorts de common law et dans divers contextes juridiques,
tant civils que criminels, avec une exception intressante : la criminalit6 en col
blanc, i propos de laquelle les discussions emploient quasi exclusivement un
vocabulaire ,punitif -. Cet article tente de d6terminer ce que pourrait 6tre une
r~ponse spdcifiquement r~paratrice J la criminalit6 en col blanc, r~ponse qui
chercherait avant toute chose A r~parerle mal caus6 par le crime. L'auteure
examine en particulier les possibilitss de participation volontaire des victimes et
des d~linquants, d'inclusion de tous les intervenants et les possibilit6s de mettre
I'accent sur les futures relations plut6t que sur les infractions pass6es - autant
d'6l6ments n6cessaires I une rencontre de r~conciliation. L'auteure arrive i la
conclusion que la criminalit6 en col blanc, par sa nature m~me, ne se prate gu~re
, la justice reparatrice. Par contre, la criminalit6 d'entreprises- les situations oc)
il
est possible de d6terminer que l'entreprise et non un individu est le d~linquant
offre de bien meilleures perspectives.
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Introduction
In a number of countries linked by their common law heritage, a trend

towards a "restorative" approach to criminality and conflict is observable.'
New Zealand-influenced by Maori traditions about the guidance and
correction of young people-has been a pioneer since 1989, and is grappling
with the challenge of bringing its restorative justice outcomes into greater
consistency with those of the conventional judicial system.2 Australia
began adopting some New Zealand practices in 1991 through the Wagga
Wagga (New South Wales) Juvenile Cautioning Program.3 The United
Kingdom, for its part, imported restorative ideas from both New Zealand
and Canada in the 1980s and 1990s.4 In the United States, restorative

justice still lurks on the fringes of the justice system,5 often in the hands
of faith-based organizations.6 In Canada, restorative justice has been tried
as a localized, grassroots response to youth crime, drug offences, and
Aboriginal community dysfunction, as well as more comprehensively in
the province of Nova Scotia.7 Restorative justice has also been employed
in much broader dispute resolution contexts, such as South Africa's Truth

and Reconciliation Commission.

1. And in some other legal cultures as well, Norway's Municipal Mediation Boards, for example.
2.
Katherine Basire, "Taking Restorative Justice Seriously" (2007) 13 Canterbury L. Rev. 31.
3. Terry O'Connell, "Wagga Wagga Juvenile Cautioning Program: 'It May Be the Way to Go!'
in L. Atkinson & S.-A. Gerull, eds. National Conference on Juvenile Justice. Conference proceedings
No. 22 (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1993).
4.
Les Davey, "The Development of Restorative Justice in the United Kingdom: A Personal
Perspective" (Paper presented to the IIRP's Sixth International Conference on Conferencing, Circles
and other Restorative Practices, Penrith, Australia, 4 March 2005) [unpublished].
5.
Sara Sun Beale, "Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States"
(2003) Utah L. Rev. 413 at 413.
6.
Katherine Beaty Chiste, "Faith-based Organizations and the Pursuit of Restorative Justice"
(2007) 32 Man. L.J. 27. See also the discussion of faith communities as reintegrating communities
in Daniel W. Van Ness & Karen Heetderks Strong, Restoring Justice: An Introduction to Restorative
Justice, 3d ed. (Dayton, OH: LexisNexis, 2006).
7.
Bruce Archibald & Jennifer Llewellyn, "The Challenge of Institutionalizing Comprehensive
Restorative Justice: Theory and Practice in Nova Scotia" (2006) 29 Dal. L.J. 297.
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Restorative justice requires face-to-face encounters, and restorative
initiatives have in common the voluntary presence of participants, the
inclusion of family and community as justice stakeholders, and a focus
forward into renewed and strengthened social networks. It can be
distinguished. from "retributive" justice-which coerces both offenders
and victims, only sometimes considers a wider array of stakeholders,
and has a retrospective focus on crimes already committed. A common
restorative intention is to heal human hurt by bringing together those who
have caused harm and those who have experienced it in a truth-telling
encounter, be it a long one or a short one, where retribution for injury has
no place. Critics of restorative justice consider it too "soft" on crime,
downright dangerous as a social practice, and unrealistic in the demands it
makes on human forgiveness.' Restoration has nevertheless been proposed
as public policy in a variety of contemporary legal contexts, both civil and
criminal, with an interesting exception: white-collar crime. White-collar
criminals and the attention they attract are publicly discussed in a rhetoric
that is largely retributive.
I. White-collar crime
White-collar crime as a modem phenomenon was described in 1940
by Australian sociologist E.H. Sutherland, who was influenced by his
observations on the commercial chicanery in elite financial circles which
contributed to the Great Depression.9 Opinions differ whether it is the
nature of an offence that makes it "white-collar," or the nature of the
offender, in particular his or her social and occupational status. Black's
Law Dictionary defines white-collar crime as "a non-violent crime
usual[ly] involving cheating or dishonesty in commercial matters."'0
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the white-collar criminal as "a
person who takes advantage of the special knowledge or responsibility
of his position to commit non-violent, often financial, crimes."" The
American Dictionaryof CriminalJustice more specifically defines white8.
The latter criticism comes in particular from Annelise Acorn, Compulsory Compassion: A
Critique ofRestorativeJustice (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); her critique is countered by - among
others - Bruce Archibald, who argues that restorative justice is neither compulsory nor necessarily
compassionate, but rather a voluntary choice of an alternative form ofjustice: Bruce Archibald, "Why
Restorative Justice is not Compulsory Compassion: Annalise Acorn's Labour of Love Lost" (2005)
42 Alta. L. Rev. 941.
9.
David Friedrichs, "Enron et al.: Paradigmatic White Collar Crime Cases for the New Century"
(2004) 12:2 Crit. Criminol. 113 at 128. Sutherland's original article is E.H. Sutherland, "White-Collar
Criminality" (1940) 5 Am. Sociological Rev. 1.
10. Blacks Law Dictionary,7th ed., s.v. "White-collar crime" [Black's].
1I. The Oxford English Dictionary, 3d ed., s.v. "White-collar," online: <http://dictionary. oed.com/
cgi/entry/50284809?single=l &qyerytype=word=white-collar&first=rm&max to show=10> [OED].
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collar crime as "nonviolent crime for financial gain committed by means
of deception by persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial,
professional or semi-professional and utilizing their special occupational
skills and opportunities."' 2 Steffensmeier argues that "white-collar crime"
is actually divided into two categories: "occupational" crimes committed
againstorganizations and "corporate" crime committed by organizations. 3
Specific offences categorized as "white-collar" include the following:
embezzlement, bribery, tax evasion, fraud, insider trading, money
laundering, misrepresentation, conspiracy, and obstruction ofjustice. The
United States added "racketeering," which arises in the case of two or
more related criminal counts and is defined by Black's as "an organized
conspiracy to commit the crimes of extortion or coercion. 1 4 It was the
innovation of New York District Attorney Rudolph Giuliani to apply
RICO15 prosecutions-formerly directed towards organized crime-to
white-collar and corporate crime as well.
For purposes of this discussion I am distinguishing white-collar crime
from "corporate crime" in that the moral agents whose actus reus and
mens rea come into question are human individuals rather than "corporate
persons."'1 6 Multiple lines of disagreement have arisen over the nature,
impact, and meaning of white-collar crime. In response to Sutherland the
question immediately arose whether there are any significant differencespsychologically, sociologically, or otherwise-between white-collar
criminals and those who commit "street" or "common" or "ordinary"
crimes. One side says, "yes," white-collar criminals are uniquely motivated
by macro-economic, social, and organizational factors such as fear of
failure in a competitive capitalist society; Benson and Moore, for example,
describe motives unique to white-collar offenders "specifically related to
their class position in the larger social structure."' 7 An opposing view
holds that crime is better understood as a single ("general" or "unified")
construct with a variety of individual applications. Gottfredson and Hirschi
prominently argued that the same causal factors, in particular a lack of

12. U.S. Department of Justice, Dictionaryof Criminal Justice Data Terminology, 1981, cited in
Judith M. Collins & Frank L. Schmidt, "Personality, Integrity, and White Collar Crime: A Construct
Validity Study" (1993) 46 Personnel Psychology 295 at 296.
13. Darrell Steffensmeier, "The Causes of 'White-Collar' Crime: An Assessment of Hirschi and
Gottfredson's Claims" (1989) 27 Criminology 345 at 354.
14. Blacks, 4th ed., s.v. "racketeering."
15. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2007).
16. There is a large literature debating what - if any - the difference is.
17. Michael L. Benson & Elizabeth Moore, "Are White Collar and Common Offenders the Same?
An Empirical and Theoretical Critique of a Recently Proposed General Theory of Crime" (1992) 29 J.
Research in Crime & Delinquency 251 at 268.
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self-control on the part of the individual, can be used to explain all crime,
white-collar included.' 8
A related realm of debate looks at white-collar crime through the
frame of political economy. Here, as well, conclusions are mixed. Paul
Jesilow proposed an Adam Smith-like argument that "white-collar crime
is encouraged when excessive regulation of the marketplace is introduced"
and that the remedy is a more perfect capitalism. 9 From this vantage point,
the white-collar criminal circumvents law not for nefarious purposes but
rather in pursuit of profits which serve not only his or her self-interest
but those of society as well. Here, "white-collar crime in the business
world is a thrust against artificially imposed legal restraint,' 20 and it is
government regulators who are the villains. Another economic perspective
on crime, the fraud minimalist position, suggests that much white-collar
crime is the result of bad judgement, bad luck, and unanticipated financial
circumstances facing the moral agents-the outcome of "risky business"
rather than criminal intent. 2' With respect to the recent series of corporate
and accounting "meltdowns" dating back to 2001, an extreme fraud
minimalist would even blame "a lack of investor vigilance" for the insider
22
looting and collapse of share value.
A more commonly held view associates white-collar crime with
the failure of government to regulate competitive capitalists. Here the
morality of commerce comes into question and in particular the moral
culture of capitalism-"the pursuit of material self-interest and individual
'23
achievement, often at the expense of others and in violation of the law.
Joel Bakan extends the critique of individual capitalists to individual
corporations in his famous analogy between the corporation and the
psychopath:
As a psychopathic creature, the corporation can neither recognize nor act
upon moral reasons to refrain from harming others. Nothing in its legal
makeup limits what it can do to others in pursuit of its selfish ends, and
it is compelled
to cause harm when the benefits of doing so outweigh
24
the costs.
18. Michael R.Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1990).
19. Paul Jesilow, "Adam Smith and White-Collar Crime: Some Research Themes" (1982) 20
Criminology 319 at 326.
20. Ibid. at321.
21. Henry N. Pontell "White-Collar Crime or Just Risky Business? The Role of Fraud in Major
Financial Debacles" (2004) 42 Crime, L. & Soc. Change 309.
22. Ibid. at 316-17.
23. James E. Coleman, "Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime" (1987) 93:2 Am. J.
Sociology 406 at 406, quoted in Benson and Moore, supra note 17.
24. Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The PathologicalPursuitof Profit and Power (Toronto: Viking
Canada, 2004).
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But dirigiste regimes are vulnerable as well, as witnessed by the recent
$7 billion trading scandal at Socit6 Grnrrale in France (described in the
business press as part of Europe's "Enron Moment")." Moreover, John
Braithwaite responds to the accusations against capitalism by pointing out
the existence of white-collar crime in non-capitalist societies such as the
former Soviet Union. 26 For Braithwaite, it is the uninhibited pursuit of
financial performance goals-whether under unregulated capitalism or
under the pressures of a centrally planned economy-that drives whitecollar crime. Other authors argue that the very structure of contemporary
societies promotes anomie and deviance at both the street and the white27
collar level of crime.
Another topic for debate is why different national jurisdictions
take different approaches to investigating, prosecuting, convicting, and
sentencing white-collar criminals. Business ethicists analyze different
cultural approaches to commercial activity and crime. Bodo Schlegelmilch
and Diana Robertson contrasted communitarian and individualistic cultures
and found that the tradition of individualism-in the United States, for
example-led to a focus on the morality and behaviour of individuals
within organizations as the proper subject of business ethics. 28 In more
communitarian cultures, "decisions lie not with the individual but with
the moral community," 29 and the accusatory spotlight is less likely to
shine on an individual CEO. The continuum between individualistic and
collectivist cultures is also one of the societal dimensions Geert Hofstede
used to explain varying cultural constraints on business management. 30 In
the one, individual achievement and the rewards it brings are celebrated;
in the other, the well-being of the social collective by far takes precedence.
This difference-and others of Hofstede's dimensions-imply different
possibilities for both the commission and the prosecution of white-collar
crime.
Of current North American interest is the contrast between the United
States, with its recent rigorous application of criminal law to white-collar
offenders, and Canada, which has largely taken the attitude that whitecollar offenders just need better regulatory guidance (and has been soundly
25. Doug Saunders, "Europe's Enron Moment has Arrived" Globe and Mail (30 January 2008) B1.
26. John Braithwaite, "White-Collar Crime, Competition, and Capitalism: Comment on Coleman"
(1988) 94 Am. J. Sociology 627.
27. Nikos Passas, "Anomie and Corporate Deviance" (1990) 14 Contemporary Crises 157.
28. Bodo B. Schlegelmilch & Diana C. Robertson, "The Influence of Country and Industry on
Ethical Perceptions of Senior Executives in the U.S. and Europe" (1995) 26 J.-Int'l Bus. Stud. 859.
29. Ibid.at 861.
30. Geert H*ofstede, "A Summary of my Ideas about National Cultural Differences" Geert Hofstede's
Homepage, online: <http://feweb.uvt.nl/center/hofstede>.
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criticized by the International Monetary Fund for its laxity)." No entities
have represented this philosophical contrast as acutely as the respective
securities commission regimes found in each nation. According to the head
of enforcement at Ontario's Securities Commission, "Canadian investors
do not want to see white-collar criminals sentenced to the same lengthy2
3
jail terms as American courts are-imposing, in securities crime cases.
Speaking from another provincial jurisdiction, the former head of the
Alberta Securities Commission puts it this way:
The focus of regulatory law is the protection of societal interests, not
punishment of an individual's moral faults. As the [Canadian] Supreme
Court has stated: 'While criminal offences are usually designed to
condemn and punish past inherently wrongful conduct, regulatory
measures are generally directed to the prevention of future harm through
the enforcement of minimum standards of conduct and care.' 33
A recent departure from this approach comes from the province of Qurbec,
where Vincent Lacroix, formerly ofNorbourg Asset Management, received
the longest sentence in Canadian history for securities fraud-twelve
years less a day for taking $115 million of investor money.34 The head
of Quebec's securities watchdog, the Autorit6 'des marches financiers,
called the sentence a breakthrough, "precedent-setting for economic crime
prosecutions across the country."35 In contrast to the overall Canadian
practice, convictions and sentences emerging from the United States in
cases such as WorldCom and Enron, among others, suggest a level of
enforcement aiming above the "minimum standards of conduct and care."
They also reflect American sentencing practices-which give judges less
of achieving
discretion than their brethren in Canada-with the objectives
36
sentencing.
in
proportionality
and
transparency, uniformity,
What interests me in this paper is what a specifically restorative
response to white-collar crime might look like, a response which would try
above all else to heal the harm that has been done to all parties. I return
here to the work of John Braithwaite, who two decades ago contrasted
31. Stephen Chase, "Canada 'Weak' on Fighting Corporate Crime, IMF Finds" Globe and Mail (14
February 2008) B2.
32. Janet McFarland, "Long Jail Terms Won't Cut It Here, OSC says". Globe andMail (28 November
2007) B4.
33. Stephen Sibold, "Want U.S.-style regulation? Make it part of the Criminal Code" Globe and
Mail (20 August 2007) B2. See also Poonam Puri, "Sentencing the Criminal Corporation" (2001) 39
Osgoode Hall L.J. 611.
34. Bertrand Marotte, "Mutual Fund Fraudster Gets 12 Years" Globe and Mail (29 January 2008)

BI.
35.
36.

Ibid at B4.
Basire, supranote 2 at 44.
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the ineffectiveness of retributive prosecution of corporate crime with the
relative success of regulatory reform.37 More recently, Archibald, Jull,
and Roach point out that from the prosecutor's point of view, "regulatory
offences are much easier to prove against corporations than true crimes."3
But I am focused on white-collarcrime and for purposes of the discussion
I adopt the Dictionaryof CriminalJustice definition: "non-violent crime
for financial gain," employing the criminal's occupational status and
skills, and I am assuming individuals rather than "corporate persons" to
be the relevant moral agents. I will approach the question by asking what
the theoretical possibilities are for a restorative encounter in the case of
a white-collar crime, an encounter which is characterized by voluntary
participation of victims and offenders, broad stakeholder inclusion, and
a focus on future relations rather than past offences; this will lead me to
discuss in turn, first, offenders; second, community; and third, victims.
I will conclude by contrasting the nature of white-collar and corporate
crime in their natural affinity, or lack of affinity, for restorative processes.
II. Volition for restoration
Llewellyn and Howse originally described the restorative encounter as one
of "truth-telling" in which both victim and offender "relate their stories of
what has happened and their experience of the event"; the encounter, they
said, is "the context in which everything else happens."39 To the extent
that there is a prototypical restorative justice encounter, a sine qua non
is an admission of guilt or acceptance of responsibility by an offendercivil or criminal. Restorative justice is not itself a way to determine
guilt or innocence, but rather a process of "repair[ing] the harm done by
the wrongful act."' An immediate problem with applying a restorative
approach to white-collar crime is the percentage of white-collar offenders
who even upon conviction deny responsibility and guilt, although
Llewellyn and Howse also note that a restorative system is "not interested in
establishing guilt with a view to punishment" but rather in explaining what
has happened so the wrongdoing can best be resolved.4 Michael Benson,
who studied the narrative strategies of white-collar criminals, found that
37. See e.g. John Braithwaite, CorporateCrime in the PharmaceuticalIndustry (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1984) and To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety (Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1985).
38. Todd L. Archibald, Kenneth E. Jull, & Kent W. Roach, Regulatory and CorporateLiability:
From Due Diligence to Risk Management(Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2007) at 6-1.
39. Law Commission of Canada, Restorative Justice - A Conceptual Framework by Jennifer J.
Llewellyn & Robert Howse (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 1999) at 59.
40. Dennis Cooley, "From Restorative Justice to Transformative Justice: Discussion Paper" (Ottawa:
Law Commission of Canada, 1999) at 3.
41. Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 39 at 58.
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above all else they deny criminal intent; they manage to account for their
behaviour in ways which result in "the perplexing ability of white-collar
offenders to avoid being characterized as criminals even though they have
been publicly convicted. '42 Part of the explanation is that in white-collar
crimes what determines the criminality is the intent of the actor-"there is
often relatively little disagreement as to what happened" 43-and the denial
of intent is an obvious defensive strategy.
In a white-collar crime the only participants who "accept responsibility"
may be those who plea-bargain their way to a lesser sentence by testifying
against other colleagues, and it is difficult to see these kinds of offenders
as having participated "voluntarily" in their justice proceedings. Two
high-profile examples come easily to mind, one American and the other
Canadian. Consider the case of Enron, the Houston-based energy trader
whose 2002 collapse eliminated $60 billion U.S. in company stock, $2
billion in employee pensions, and thousands of jobs." Chief executive
officer Jeffrey Skilling was sentenced to twenty-four years and four months
in prison for his part in fraud, conspiracy, and insider trading. Crucial to
Skilling's conviction (and that of the late Kenneth Lay, Enron's founder)
was the testimony of Andrew Fastow, the chief financial officer "pegged
as the mastermind" of the crime.45 Fastow himself was charged with
ninety-eight counts of insider trading, money laundering, tax violations,
and other offences; he received a six-year term after pleading guilty to
two counts of conspiracy to commit fraud.46 The former head of the U.S.
Justice Department's task force on Enron explained the difference between
twenty-four and six years: "those below Skilling all pleaded guilty to some
offences, expressed remorse and in some cases went on to cooperate with the
prosecution."47 Fastow's lawyer described his client as having "undergone
a transformation from a man in denial of what he did to someone desperate
to make amends;" and Fastow himself told the court that he was "ashamed
to the core."48 But the context of the plea bargain he and his wife (and
fellow Enron employee) struck with the U.S. government is unmistakably

42. Michael L. Benson, "Denying the Criminal Mind: Accounting for Involvement in a WhiteCollar Crime" (1985) 23 Criminology at 589, 585.
43. Ibid. at 589.
44. "Enron's Jeff Skilling Begins 24-year Prison Term," CBC News (13 December 2006), online:
CBC News <http://origin.www.cbc.calmoney/story/2006/12112/skillingprison.html> [Skilling].
45. Ibid.
46. "Ex-Enron Executive Fastow Gets 6-year Sentence," CBC News (26 September 2006), online:
CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2006109/26/fastowprisonsentence.html>.
47. "Skilling," supra note 44.
48. Barrie McKenna, "'Ashamed to the Core,' an Ex-CEO Repents," Globe and Mail (27 September
2006) B 1-8.
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a coercive one: Lea Fastow had already started her two-year sentence on
tax evasion when her husband reached his deal, and Mr. Fastow's term was
delayed until she was released so that their two young sons would have at
least one parent at home during the Fastows' incarceration.
Canadians might want to think about media corporation Hollinger
International and the fate of its two founders, Conrad Black and David
Radler. They were prosecuted criminally in the United States for fraud
(and in Black's case racketeering and money laundering) although at a
much lower level of financial magnitude than the Enron case. Radlerwho paid $53 million to settle lawsuits involving Hollinger-pled guilty
to one count of fraud, testified against Black, paid a $250,000 (US) fine,
and received a twenty-nine-month sentence, with the hope of serving
49
his time in Canada where early release from jail is less problematic.
Radler's testimony, however, was not considered credible, and the U.S.
prosecutors themselves called on the jury to disregard it.5 0 Black, on
the other hand, not only made no attempt to plea bargain or voice any
remorse, but openly expressed his disdain for the U.S. District Court
proceedings. In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation
prior to sentencing, he claimed he had not suffered a fall from grace, but "a
persecution"; he added, "anyone who actually looks at the evolution of the
case and the evidence supporting the charges will see what rubbish it is." 51
Nevertheless, a Chicago jury found him guilty of obstruction of justice
and three counts of mail fraud, and the judge fined him $125,000, ordered
a $6.1 million forfeiture, and sentenced him to seventy-eight months in a
U.S. prison, where he will be serving at least eighty-five per cent of his
sentenced time.
In a Law Commission of Canada paper on restorative justice, Cooley
addressed the problem of coercion, noting that "even when both victims and
offenders consent to a restorative justice program coercion operates on a
more subtle level."52 Cooley admits, however, that "genuine voluntariness
may be a standard that is too high to achieve."53 For a moment, I would
like to consider the offender him or herself in the case of a white-collar
crime and the likelihood that he would walk a restorative path without
being coerced into it. The traditional constituencies of restorative justice,

49. Paul Waldie, "Collected Woes" Report on Business Magazine (November 2006) at 39.
50. "Theresa Tedesco, "Radler Met with Author Before Testimony" NationalPost (14 November
2007), online: <http://nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=95966>.
51. Tara Perkins, "Black Defends Rant against U.S. System" Globe and Mail (3 December 2007)
A8.
52. Cooley, supra note 40 at 37.
53. Ibid.
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as they have evolved in many jurisdictions, have often been citizens from
the more vulnerable socioeconomic echelons-Aboriginal peoples or the
young, for example. Some have also been geographically remote, such
as the Canadian north or the Australian outback, where the expensive
paraphernalia of the "flying court" can motivate a more communitybased (and more cost-effective) approach to justice. But the white-collar
offender, among other qualities, is less likely to be young and socially
malleable, or on the socioeconomic margins of society-and without the
resources to mount a high-powered legal defence." He or she, whether
high or low profile to society at large, is not among the powerless.
For the white-collar offender the threat of incarceration, financial loss,
and public humiliation-or genuine repentance-may drive cooperation
in the form of a guilty plea. But the literature suggests that the overall
psychology and personality traits of white-collar criminals do not mesh
well with the requirement of restorative justice that they acknowledge
their actions as wrongful and come without coercion to a restorative
process, one of the purposes of which is the restoration of social harmony.
A study by Collins and Schmidt found that white-collar offenders tend
towards irresponsibility, undependability, and disregard for social rules
and norms; those authors characterize the overall psychological pattern
as a lack of "social conscientiousness."5 5 An extension of the Collins and
Schmidt work by Blickle et al. found that high hedonism and narcissism
differentiated white-collar criminals from white-collar non-criminals.5 6
Narcissism itself features grandiosity, a need for admiration, and a lack
of empathy for others.17 Conrad Black's much quoted e-mail response
to questions about his use of the corporate plane for a personal vacation
is illustrative: "I'm not prepared to re-enact the French revolutionary
renunciation of the rights of the nobility ... We have to find a balance
between an unfair taxation on the company and a reasonable treatment of
the founder-builder-managers. We are proprietors, after all, beleaguered
though we may be." 58

54. See Steffensmeier, supranote 13 on the problem of analyzing white-collar crime demographics.
See also Colleen Anne Deall & Roberta Lynn Sinclair, "The Effect of Police Investigation Time on
Sentence Disposition in White-Collar Theft and Fraud Cases" (2003) 1 Can. J. Police and Security 163
for further demographic analysis.
55. Collins & Schmidt, supranote 12.
56. Gerhard Blickle, et al., "Some Personality Correlates of Business White-Collar Crime" (2006)
55 Applied Psychology: An International Review 220.
57. American Psychological Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
3rd. ed. (Washington, DC: APA, 1987), quoted in Blickle et al., ibid.at 222.
58. Quoted in "Black Compared Himself with French Nobility, Documents Say," CBC News (12
December 2006), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2006/12/12/black.html>.
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Empathy for victims (and for offenders) is important in a restorative
encounter. As Llewellyn and Howse explain, empathy "allows the
wrongdoer to hear and understand the victim's story of her experience.
Such understanding is crucial for both reconciliation between the victim
and wrongdoer, and for efforts to arrive at an appropriate agreement
to repair the damage, and restore the relationship."59 But the social
relationships which restorative justice seeks to rebuild in the aftermath
of a white-collar crime-the trust of colleagues, co-workers, and
shareholders, for example-might be of limited importance to the whitecollar criminal. A control theory of white-collar crime suggests that these
offenders experience weak bonds and attachments to their organization
rather than strong ones which might have acted to control their deviant
behaviour.60 Braithwaite and Drahos have also noted the ability of whitecollar criminals to "segregate" their audiences from one another: "In
their business dealings, they have a ruthless, exploitative ethos, while at
their church on Sunday the members of their congregation view them as
a paragon of gentility."' 6 ' Enron's founder Kenneth Lay, son of a Baptist
minister, was described as personally projecting on the one hand "an
image of decency, generosity, charm, and-or so it seemed-integrity,"
and yet described in the workplace, along with his co-accused, as "lacking
in basic integrity and greedy. '62 To the extent that a white-collar criminal
is predisposed towards "empathy," it may be directed at his personal
rather than his professionalaudience.
Cooley has argued that the mainstream criminal process encourages
many offenders "to be passive and to plead guilty in order to receive
the most lenient sentence possible"; as a consequence, therefore, "their
crime is objectified and abstracted from the social context in which it
took place. '63 Writing in 1940, Sutherland theorized that it is the social
costs of white-collar crime that are the most damaging. Economists call
them "externalities": "A side-effect or consequence (of an industrial
or commercial activity) which affects other parties without this being

59. Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 39 at 52.
60. James R.Lasley, "Toward a Control Theory of White-Collar Offending" (1988) 4 J. Quantitative
Criminology 347.
61. John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, "Zero Tolerance, Naming and Shaming: Is There a Case
for it with Crimes of the Powerful?" (Paper presented to the Australian and New Zealand Society of
Criminology Conference, Perth, Australia, 30 September 1999) [unpublished].
62. E. Thomas & A. Murr, "The Gambler Who Blew it All" Newsweek (4 February 2002) at 19,
quoted in Friedrichs, supra note 9 at 121.
63. Dennis Cooley, "Restorative Justice in Canada: Lessons Learned" (Presented at the Practical
Approaches to Appropriate Dispute Resolution Conference, Canadian Bar Association, Vancouver,
8-9 March 2002) 8 [emphasis added] [Cooley, "Restorative Justice"].
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reflected in the cost of the goods of services involved."'
to Sutherland:

But according

The financial loss from white-collar crime, great as it is, is less important
than the damage to social relations. White-collar crimes violate trust and
therefore create distrust, which lowers social morale and produces social
relatively little
disorganization on a large scale. Other crimes produce
65
effect on social institutions or social organization.
In the aftermath of the "Enron et. al." cases of 2001-2004, Friedrichs adds
to the "extraordinary" financial costs this series of scandals has posed the
"somewhat more abstract but very real costs [of] enhanced physical and
mental distress for those most directly affected; erosion of trust in major
66
institutions; and intensification of inter-group resentment and conflicts.
In a milieu of social distrust and resentment, it may also be that the
victims of white-collar crimes are themselves unlikely to seek restoration
rather than retribution, feeling schadenfreude rather than empathy for
the fallen CEO. Restorative justice scholar Braithwaite admits it is true:
"our nature is to want comeuppance for those who wrong us."'67 When
Lacroix received his precedent-setting twelve-year sentence in Quebec,
those present in the courtroom applauded. 68 Addressing this reality at a
conference on securities enforcement in Ontario, one shareholder activist
stated that many investors who have been deeply hurt by securities frauds
"desperately want to see offenders sentenced to jail. ' 69 In the Black case,
the sentence awarded was significantly lower than what the prosecution
had asked for (nineteen to twenty-four years), and the shareholder value
of Hollinger largely vanished over the course of the investigation and
prosecution. Yet some victims of the crime expressed satisfaction with the
personal outcome for Conrad Black:
The criminal convictions alone have provided sufficient returns on their
investment. In the case of Herbert Denton, an investor and director
of Sun-Times Media, seeing Lord Black behind prison bars was more
important than recovering
the millions of dollars he has allegedly fleeced
70
from shareholders.

64. OED, supranote 11,
s.v. "externality."
65. Edwin H. Sutherland, "White-Collar Criminality" (1940) 5 Am. Sociol. Rev. I at 5.
66. Friedrichs, supranote 9 at 115.
67. John Braithwaite, "Narrative and 'Compulsory Compassion,"' (2006) 31 Law & Soc. Inquiry
425 at 432 [Braithwaite, "Narrative"].
68. Sean Silcoff, "Longest Term Meted Out for Security Fraud" NationalPost(29 January 2008).
69. Quoted in McFarland, supranote 32 at B4.
70. Teresa Tedesco, "The Hollinger Story: 'Left Out to Dry' National Post (8 December 2007)
FP7.
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As Cooley explains, in the course of restorative justice practice, "elaborate
protocols have been developed to deal with the issue of coercion" in
the pursuit of a restorative justice encounter.7 He lists them:' almost
all restorative justice programs are voluntary; participants must give
"informed consent"; participants may withdraw; and participants may
bring supporters to a restorative encounter. But, first of all, where a
society chooses to prosecute white-collar offenders criminally-rather
than encourage a regulatory, tort law, or other approach to the harm they
do--all stakeholders party to whatever justice process may ensue will have
been coerced to the table without a restorative option. And, second, the
willingness of white-collar crime victims to seek a restorative encounter
with an offender, rather than watch retribution take its course, cannot be
taken for granted.
III. Stakeholders to restoration
Writing in the context of the South African truth commission, VillaVicencio notes, "[i]n terms of restorative justice ideals, the participation
of all parties to the conflict is imperative to ensure maximum chance to a
satisfactory resolution."72 In the case of a white-collar crime, an offender
might or might not be willing to participate. A victim might decline as well.
And what about everybody else? Llewellyn and Howse have addressed
the question of what to do when one of the parties refuses to participate,
and their suggestion is that in such a case the role of "community" is
key: "Both the victim and the wrongdoer are members of a community
and their relationship with the community was also damaged. Thus, the
community can play a part in helping to bring victim and perpetrator back
into the community from which they were isolated by the wrong."" But
what community do stakeholders to a white-collar crime belong to? In the
business management context, according to Freeman a "stakeholder" is
"any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement
of the organization's objectives. '74 The stakeholders are those to whom
the organization has an obligation to act fairly. 7 The white-collar
criminal is by definition part of an organizational community which has
occasioned the criminal opportunity. So there are stakeholders internal
to the organization affected by the crime (whom I will discuss in the next
71. Cooley, "Restorative Justice," supra note 63 at 10.
72. Charles Villa-Vicencio, "The Reek of Cruelty and the Quest for Healing - Where Retributive
and Restorative Justice Meet" (1999-2000) 14 J.L. & Religion 165 at 181.
73. Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 39 at 83.
74. R.E. Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Boston: Pitman, 1984) at 46.
75. Mark N. Wexler, Confronting Moral Worlds: UnderstandingBusiness Ethics (Scarborough,
ON: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 2000) at 84.
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section of this paper) but also external stakeholders affected by the crime's
impact on the business and its wider social relationships and, indeed, on
"society in general." And using Freeman's definition, these external and
community stakeholders can affect the white-collar criminal as well, both
before and after conviction.
One of the goals of restorative justice is "to engage the community in
the justice process.

'76

The argument is made that through engaging and

dealing with conflict among members a community develops its social
capital, its social networks and civic interconnectedness: a process which
"encourages trust, discourages political and economic opportunism, and
facilitates collaboration towards a common goal. 7 7 Nils Christie identified
the dangers for a community of leaving conflict resolution to the justice
professionals:
Community, he says, is made from conflict as much as from cooperation;
the capacity to resolve conflict is what gives social relations their sinew.
Professionalizing justice "steals the conflict," robbing the community
of its ability to face trouble and restore peace. Communities lose their
confidence, their capacity, and, finally, their inclination to preserve their
own order. They become instead consumers ofpolice and court "services"
with the consequence that they largely cease to be communities."8
Moreover, in highly industrialized societies, there are major problems "in
organizing their members in ways such that a decent quota take part in any
activity at all."7 9 Conflict resolution-restorative justice--offers citizens
an opportunity for social participation,and taking away that opportunity
represents a loss in potential social capital.
Christie says there is another loss to society through the professionalizing
ofjustice. He sees restorative encounters as an opportunity for society"for us"--to engage in "norm-clarification" or political debate. Leaving
justice to the professionals represents "a loss of pedagogical possibilities.
It is a loss of opportunities for a continuous discussion of what represents
the law of the land."80 In the case of white-collar offences, when they
are treated solely as a matter for professional prosecution, an opportunity
is lost for citizens and community members to explore the morality of
commerce, or socioeconomic inequity, or the temptations of great wealth,
76. Cooley, "Restorative Justice in Canada," supra note 63 at 12.
77. Ibid.
78. David Cayley, The Expanding Prison: The Crisis in Crime and Punishment and the Searchfor
Alternatives (Toronto: Anansi Press, 1998) at 168.
79. Nils Christie, "Conflicts as Property," in Gerry Johnstone, ed. A Restorative Justice Reader:
Texts, Sources, Contexts (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2003) 57 at 61.
80. Ibid.
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or the responsibilities of the powerful, or what "represents the law of the
land," in a purposeful and a meaningful way. Evidence suggests that
the Canadian public is suspicious of the use and abuse of power by the
business community, whether the topic for debate is CEO compensation,
price fixing, accounting fraud, substandard products, or globalization. 8
To the extent that white-collar offences are dealt with solely as crime, an
opportunity is lost for restoration ofpublic trust in business-itselfa "social
relationship" shaken by the recent cycle of scandals and collapses.
-One of the reasons for inviting external stakeholders, or broader
community members, to participate in a restorative justice process is their
ability "to evoke a sense of shame among wrongdoers."82 Here I turn to
the concept of "reintegrative shaming," which brings me once again to
Braithwaite. In Crime, Shame and Reintegration83 he argued that what
makes a criminal sanction effective is not its severity but rather its social
"embeddedness." Reintegrative shaming is an effective sanction found
under "communitarian" circumstances:, in "close-knit societies where
people confront each other on a relatively equal footing." 84 As Braithwaite
describes it:
Reintegrative shaming means that expressions ofcommunity disapproval,
which may range from mild rebuke to degradation ceremonies, are
followed by gestures of reacceptance into the community of law-abiding
citizens ...
Disintegrative shaming (stigmatization), in contrast, divides
the community by creating a class of outcasts.
These definitions raise a couple of questions. First, are the recent
high-profile prosecutions, convictions, and punishments of whitecollar criminals in North America more conducive to reintegrative or
disintegrative shaming? And what role is "the community" playing? For
example, did the re-naming of Enron Field in Houston, Texas to "Minute
Maid Park"86 have any reintegrative purpose or impact? Or did Queen's
University's return of David Radler's $1 million donation for its business

81. Len Karakowsky, Archie B. Carroll, & Ann K. Buchholtz, Business and Society: Ethics and
Stakeholder Management (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2005) at 17-18.
82. Cooley, "Restorative Justice in Canada," supra note 63 at 5.
83. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
84. Cayley, supra note 78 at 274.
85. Braithwaite, Crime,Shame andReintegration,supranote 83 at 55.
86. "Branding for Dollars: The Growth of Corporate Naming Rights" CBCNews (15 February 2007),
online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/marketing/index.html>.
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school87 seek to restore his "right relation""8 with the community? In both
cases those were actions by external community stakeholders, adding their
own degradation ceremonies over and above conviction and imprisonment
by the professionals.
A second question is whether reintegrative shaming by community
members, in a white-collar crime context, could ever take place among
"a close-knit group of people who are relative equals." How might
community stakeholders who have never met the shamed executive and
have never possessed his or her socioeconomic power participate in
the aftermath of a white-collar crime to reintegrate the offender rather
than cast him out into social isolation? And would the executive care?
Braithwaite has pointed out the evidence that "shaming by people the
offender does not respect fails to induce shame": "Indeed, the only
shaming that induces shame is disapproval of the act by those who we
respect very highly. Just respecting them a bit is not enough. So shaming
by police, judges and mass publics who read newspapers is mostly beside
the point."89 Yet Braithwaite, who for years has been thinking about how
society deals with the crimes of the powerful, considers "naming and
shaming" them a moral imperative, in that the impact the stigmatization
will have on their personal community--one which they psychologically
segregate or "segment" from all the rest-will indeed provoke personal
responsibility. In other words, the loftiest CEO, in his or her church, or
country club, or professional association, or family, is likely to possess a
close-knit community whose opinion and whose shaming is very much
"to the point."
As the Llewellyn and Howse excerpt from earlier in this section
suggests, a white-collar crime will have broken social relationships which
restoration would seek to rebuild. Some of these will be personal. In
the case of a crime committed within a business organization, the wider
relationships will primarily be marketplace ones. The stakeholders to
a white-collar crime at a major corporation may be numerous, the harm
done to them great, yet it will be difficult to identify or quantify or
associate with specific individual victims. Enron's collapse cost billions
of dollars in jobs, stock value, and pensions, and took down accounting
firm Arthur Anderson as well. In the case of Conrad Black, of course, it
is his prosecution, rather than the criminality of his business practices,
87. Jordan Timm, "Where Did it All Go Wrong?" Macleans (8 May 2007), online: <http://www.
macleans.ca/canada/features>.
88. Restorative justice critic Annelise Acorn considers an idealized notion of right-relation as "the
distinctive element of restorative justice," supranote 8 at 20.
89. Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 61 at 7.
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which arguably did Hollinger and its shareholders and employees the most
damage. 90 In the aftermath of a white-collar crime, the hosting organization
may be razed to the ground, as in Enron's case, or merely suffer losses in
reputation, trust, and goodwill. There are many external stakeholders,
especially with a large business, who may suffer. Governments at all levels
lose tax revenues when a business implodes. Banks and insurers may
become enmeshed as well. Communities, charities, and non-governmental
organizations forego donations of money, time, and expertise, as corporate
philanthropy gives way to corporate survival. Competitors may be tainted
by industry scandal, and intangible losses in public trust may ensue.
Of course, a few stakeholders to a white-collar crime may emerge as
winners. Benson has noted that the outcomes of some white-collar crimes
possess "partial legitimacy." He gives the examples of antitrust or tax
offences which result in more than just an illegal gain for the perpetrators:
"they may also shore up a failing business or provide stability in employment
...
[T]he harm experienced by the victim or victims is balanced against
the benefits derived by other uninvolved parties, such as employees and
family." '9 1 Prosecutors may enhance reputations and, in the U.S. case,
leverage their success into political office; the recently disgraced Eliot
Spitzer, who resigned as Governor of New York in March 2008 after a
prostitution scandal, had used his eight years as attorney general to develop
a reputation as the white knight who enforced high ethical standards on
Wall Street. 92 Already ensconced politicians may garner further support
by playing the white-collar "crime card." Lawyers and consultants for
both sides may collect millions. Consumers and clients may benefit from
a cleaner capitalism. Corporate governance activists may validate their'
existence and attract further support. Competitors may gain market share.
The organization itself may refocus and renew its mission in a more ethical,
and profitable, direction.
Within this complex of social possibilities, I think the closest
relationship the convicted white-collar criminal can have to community
stakeholders-as long as the criminal stigma persists-is a representational
one: a contemporary Hester Prynne to display the scarlet letter of
corporate deviance and thus be "a living sermon against sin." 93 From this
90. This is certainly the opinion of Conrad Black himself.
91. Benson, supranote 42 at 603.
92. Albeit a White Knight whose own ethical standards of prosecution were questioned. See Allan
Chernoff, "Behind the Scenes: Spitzer's Resignation" CNN (13 March 2008), online: CNN Politics
<http://edition.cnn.com/2008IPOLITICS/03/12/btsl.chernoff.spitzer/index.html>.
93. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The ScarletLetter (Pleasantville, NY: Reader's Digest Association, 1984)
at 22.
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perspective the "right relation" he or she has with the community is to
deter criminal activity, with all its stakeholder consequences, in others.
Certainly the deterrence factor is repeatedly invoked by prosecutors
seeking harsh white-collar sanctions and the judges who oblige them. In
The Scarlet Letter, despite her years of stigmatization as an adulteress,
Hester Prynne finds social acceptance in the end for her contributions to
the community both through the handiwork by which she made her living
and her readiness to sustain the poor and care for the sick:
The letter [A] was the symbol of her calling. Such helpfulness was found
in her,-so much power to do, and power to sympathize,-- that many
people refused to interpret the scarlet A by its original signification.
They said that it meant Able; so strong was Hester Prynne, with -a
woman's strength.94
Although Hawthorne was less sanguine about the possibility of restoration
with Hester's individual consciousness of guilt, I believe he was describing
a restorative community outcome.
A prominent example of a white-collar offender who acknowledged
this Hester Prynne role comes from the American public sector and
Charles Colson, special counsel to the late President Richard Nixon during
the political scandal of Watergate. Colson, who was involved in illegal
intelligence-gathering against the opposing Democratic Party, pled guilty
to obstruction of justice in 1974 and served seven months in prison.95
Writing in his memoir Born Again, Colson explains the motivation for
telling his story:
Who was I to moralize, to preach to others? I'd botched it, was one of
those who helped bring on Watergate and was in prison to prove it. Yet
maybe that very fact, plus some unusual things which had happened to
me, could give me some insights that would help others. Could there be
a purpose to all that had happened to me?96
Colson went on to found the outreach group Prison Fellowship Ministries
and become a prominent evangelical critic of the United States prison
system, but it was not until the year 2000 that Florida Governor Jeb Bush
formally removed Colson's criminal stigma with an executive order

94. Ibid. at 115.
95. "Revisiting Watergate: Charles Colson" Washington Post, online: <http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/onpolitics/watergate/chares.html>.
96. Charles W. Colson, Born Again (Old Tappan, NJ: Chosen Books, 1976) at 10.
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restoring his rights to vote, serve on a jury, run for office, and practice law
in his community. 97
The ranks of high-profile white-collar offenders who have re-entered
the community upon sanction, prosecution, or conviction-up until the
recent wave-are not insignificant in number. There are a variety of
paths back, and one approach is to simply change communities. Among
Canadian businessmen, Edmonton's Donald Cormie, convicted in 1992 of
misleading investors with his advertising and marketing practices, moved
to Arizona.9 8 Bre-X geologist and vice-chairman John Felderhof (acquitted
in 2007. of insider trading and issuing misleading press releases) relocated
to the Cayman Islands and Indonesia.99 Others, finding themselves barred
from the business where their offences were committed, change the
business they are in. Brian Costello, sanctioned by the OSC in 2003 for
unethical financial advising, entered the lawn care products market. 0
Scott Paterson, a 2001 target of the OSC for securities violations, turned
to. cable television.' 0' Michael Cowpland, an insider trading offender,
settled with the OSC in 2003 and went from office software to an internet
television venture.0 2 Nelson Skalbania, convicted of theft in 1996, served
a one-year monitored sentence at home and now runs a solar energy
company.0 3 Since all of these men are still stigmatized by The Globe and
Mail as "fallen titans" who fell afoul of the law, 1 4 it is difficult to judge
whether they have reconciled with Canadian society in a restorative sense.
And since the most recent U.S. approach to white-collar crime has been
aggressively retributive, especially in high-profile cases, many of the
American potential or theoretical candidates for restoration with society
are still sitting in prison cells.0 5
IV. Healing and restoration
To return to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
Villa-Vicencio emphasized its intent to focus on the victims of apartheid
97. "Watergate Figure Colson Has Civil Rights Restored in Florida" CNN (10 October 2000), online:
<http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/l0/0/colson.rights.ap/index.html>.
98. Waldie, supranote 49 at 43.
99. "OSC Won't Appeal Felderhof Bre-X Acquittal" CBC News (23 August 2007), online: <http://
www.cbc.ca/money/story/2007/08/23/osc-felderhof.html>.
100. Waldie, supranote 49 at 41.
101. Ibid. at 45.
102. Ibid. at 48.
103. Ibid. at 54.
104. Waldie, supra note 49.
105. However, according to the U.S. Justice Department, sixty-one per cent of those sentenced in
the Bush administration;s crackdown on corporate crime spent no more than two years in jail. "Most
Caught in U.S. Crackdown on Corporate Fraud Escape Stiff Penalty" National Post (14 December
2007) at FP5.
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rather than its perpetrators. "For all its limitations," he writes, "[the
Commission] looked forward in the promotion of healing and reparation,
rather than backward to what happened as a basis for revenge."' 016 And
the Commission demonstrated that it is logistically possible to deal with
multiple offenders, multiple victims. Villa-Vicencio sees a link between
retributive and restorative justice: while punishment of the offender can
assert the value and dignity of the victim, retribution on its own rarely
provides for healing and rehabilitation. One of the points of restorative
justice, and its potential path towards healing, is to listen to people whose
stories "are normally not taken seriously,"' 0 7 and one of the characteristics
of white-collar crime, in particular of the "Enron et al." variety, is the
disconnect between those who committed the crime and those who suffered
its effects. Friedrichs describes Enron et al. as a "paradigmatic form of
white collar crime," "committed by privileged, respectable members of
society, violating a fundamental trust, through major corporations, for
purposes of financial gain (and to avoid financial loss), with devastating
economic consequences for ordinary members of society."'0 8 In a whitecollar crime restorative encounter, or series of encounters, these ordinary
members of society would come front and centre to tell their stories, and
their healing and repair would take priority. What might this look like?
There are multiple challenges.
According to Braithwaite, "[t]he restorative justice ideal is to remedy
the imbalance in the way conventional criminal justice continues to focus
on the needs of the offender for rehabilitation at many stages-court,
prison, parole-while the victims are lucky to have their needs attended to
even at the sentencing stage."' 10 9 McCold and Wachtel distinguish between
primary, secondary, and vicarious victims of a crime. The latter are "the
public or society; in other words, those who become aware of the crime,"' 1
and I addressed their interests in the previous section. However, these
two authors emphatically make the point that "a fundamental principle of
restorative justice is that society is not the victim, government is not the
victim, the victim is the victim,""' and I am keeping their words in mind.
I turn therefore to the primary and secondary victims of a white-collar
crime. For discussion purposes, I will include in the category of "primary

106. Villa-Viceneio, supra note 72 at 175.
107. Braithwaite, "Narrative," supra note 67 at 428.
108. Friedrichs, supra note 9 at 128.
109. Braithwaite, "Narrative," supra note 67 at 439.
110. Paul McCold & Benjamin Wachtel, "Community is not a Place: A New Look at Community
Justice Initiatives" in Johnstone, supra note 79 at 295.
I11. Ibid. at 297.
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victims" what Pontell calls the "immediate victims" of a White-collar
crime-investors and loyal employees of the host organization" 2-- and
I will categorize close family and friends of the offender as "secondary
victims" of his or her crime.
Writing on the psychology of forgiveness, John R. Gehm observes that
crime victims are angry and they have "a moral justification for that anger";
he adds, "[a]nger arouses a desire for revenge that does not diminish until it
is recognized and released.""' He identifies three mechanisms for dealing
with anger: denial, expression, and forgiveness. Expressing anger "is to
be encouraged, [but] it has only limited value with respect to lessening
the desire for revenge and release from its power.' '" 4 Forgiveness, though,
may play a role "in allowing individuals to get on with their lives less
encumbered by the pain and power of the past.""' 5 Writing in a Christian
context, Allard and Northey argue that "forgiveness as technique and
tool is also perhaps the most significant process for overcoming the
devastation of crime."'116 So, how might primary victims of a white-collar
crime "recognize and release" their anger at the devastation which has
been wrought upon their lives?
David Paciocco traces the way in which our current criminal justice
system has attempted to include victims of crime in the justice process.
This has taken place largely through the presentation of "victim impact
statements" to the court, a procedure I would characterize, using
Gehm's analysis, as an opportunity to "express anger" rather than deny
it and possibly open up a space for "forgiveness." However, the modem
movement towards including a "victims' perspective," through keeping
them better informed and offering them a chance to speak to the court,
has not necessarily increased victim satisfaction." 7 Moreover, according
to Paciocco, victims' impact statements "tend, on balance, to provide little
112. Pontell, supra note 21 at 317.
113. John R. Gehm, "The Function of Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System" in Johnstone,
supranote 79 at 282.
114. Ibid. at 283.
115. Ibid.

116. Pierre Allard & Wayne Northey, "Christianity: the Rediscovery of Restorative Justice" in
Johnstone, ibid.at 159.
117. Three recent studies on victim satisfaction from Canada, the United States, and the United
Kingdom are Canada, Department of Justice, Victim participation in the Plea Negotiation Process
in Canada by Simon N. Verdun-Jones & Adamira A. Tijerino, eds. (Ottawa: Policy Centre for Victim
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Satisfaction with the Criminal Justice System" (2006) 253 Nat'l Inst. Just. J. at 16, online: <http://www.
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constructive information, and they threaten to distort the process. They
do so, in part, by inviting emotion to overtake reason."" 8 In the Conrad
Black case, one victim impact statement was delivered-by Eugene
Fox, a managing partner at Cardinal Capital Corporation, one of two
investor groups who challenged Hollinger International over its executive
compensation and payment practices and paved the way for the criminal
prosecutions. In his formal statement, Fox reported that Black showed
contempt for shareholders, called him (Fox) an "idiot," and lied to him
"openly and repeatedly."'119 Fox later expressed his offense at Black's own
apology to the court and Black's blaming of his successors at Hollinger for
20
the loss of shareholder value.
The "victims' rights" movement in general, which is different from
restorative initiatives such as victim-offender mediation, has not itself been
restorative in philosophy, although as Archibald points out it has been "the
most significant influence for reform on Canadian criminal justice within
the last twenty years."' 2' As the notion of "victims' rights" developed
many interest groups came to support "a political agenda of vindictiveness
and punitiveness"' 22 towards offenders. Crime victims, says Roach,
"were constructed as the new consumers of the services, information, and
punishment provided by police and prosecutors"; he adds, in this sense,
"victims' rights legitimated crime control.' 23 Many elected politicians,
sensing this moral and demographic constituency, positioned themselves
as the "law and order" candidates-self-proclaimed avengers for these
victims of crime. "Shareholders' rights" activists have also developed into
a combative constituency, seeking an influence over corporate activity
beyond the traditional legal rights enjoyed by shareholders, such as the
right to see records and reports or the right to vote at the corporation's
annual general meeting. 24 In addition to traditional shareholders primarily
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Justice" Mackenzie Financial (10 December 2007).
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Canadian Press (II December 2007).
121. Bruce P. Archibald, "Coordinating Canada's Restorative and Inclusionary Models of Criminal
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9 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 215 at 225.
122. Beale, supra note 5 at 430. See also Katherine Beckett & Theodore Sasson, The Politics of
Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication, 2004).
123. Kent Roach, Due Processand Pictims'Rights:. The New Law and Politics of CriminalJustice
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 278.
124. Richard A. Yates, Teresa Bereznicki-Korol & Trevor Clarke, Business Law in Canada, 7th ed.
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interested in financial performance, companies now face "socially activist"
shareholders speaking on behalf of tertiary stakeholders, such as those
concerned about corporations' global labour practices and environmental
25
impact. 1
Karakowsky, Carroll, and Buchholtz point out that today "both groups
of shareholders feel like neglected constituencies, particularly in light of
recent corporate abuses,"'2 6 and shareholders who have been victimized
by a white-collar crime may have little predisposition towards being
"satisfied" with the conviction and jailing of a white-collar criminal. But
seeking "victim satisfaction" with a mainstream justice outcome such as
Black's conviction strikes me as a regressive rather than a progressive
approach. Let us ask instead what the primary and secondary victims
of a white-collar crime could have to look forward to in a specifically
restorative process. Christie described the victim of crime in a mainstream
justice proceeding as "a particularly heavy loser," who has not only been
hurt but has also been denied participation in his own case: "It is the
Crown that comes into the spotlight, not the victim. It is the Crown that
describes the losses, not the victim. It is the Crown that appears in the
newspaper, very seldom the victim. It is the Crown that gets a chance to
27
talk to the offender... o,,
Victims themselves entered this formal process

when the Canadian Criminal Code was amended in 1995 to provide for
restorative aims in sentencing. Section 718 (e) establishes the objective
of "[providing] reparations for harm done to victims or to the community"
and section 718 (f) adds "[promoting] a sense of responsibility in
offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and to the
community."
As the practice of restorative justice has developed in Canada; the
evaluation of its effectiveness has focused largely on "outcomes,"
measured in various ways (an approach questioned by restorative justice
participants). In particular, three measures have evolved: victim-offender
"satisfaction" surveys, "restitution compliance" studies, and "recidivism
recurrence" reports.'28 So, in the case of a white-collar restorative
encounter, a successful outcome in this model would produce satisfaction
in both the offender and his victims, result in restitution being made for
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126. Karakowsky, Carroll & Buchholtz, supranote 81 at 574.
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the harm committed, and see the white-collar offender never offend again.
I would like to consider three categories of victims, first those "primary"
victims who are shareholders and investors in a company, second, the other
primary victims who are "loyal employees" of the corporation, and third,
the personal circle of friends and family, who are secondary victims of the
crime. Cayley points out that "the debt an offender owes a victim is more
palpable than the debt he owes society,"' 29 and the white-collar offender
has accumulated a variety of debts to a variety of victims.
There may be cases in which financial restitution by a white-collar
criminal is possible. David Radler provides one example. His restitution,
however, pales in comparison to the amount paid by Michael Milken
and Drexel Burnham Lambert, Wall Street junk bond kings of the 1980s;
Milken's overall bill in fines, penalties, and restitution has been estimated
at more than $1 billion U.S. 30 While these two cases illustrate restitution
in a manner afforded to white-collar perpetrators who remain relatively
well-heeled and sufficiently liquid, restitution in many instances can also
be effected through seizure and forfeiture of less liquid assets, such as real
estate, automobiles, art, jewelry, and other physical assets deemed to have
been acquired with the proceeds of financial crime. Where the white-collar
criminal has lost everything, other parties complicit to a white-collar crime
may be coerced by legal action into compensating victims. Enron itself
being bankrupt, Enron investors sued the banks they accused of helping
the company perpetuate its crimes and received a $7.2 billion settlement
(with a demand by their lawyers for a $700 million legal payment)."'
There may be other cases in which an apology or statement of regret is
all the white-collar criminal can bring to the table. This would certainly be
the case where the perpetrator has financially destroyed himself as a result
of his own misdeeds. Levi identifies four categories of apologies:
In a tactical apology the suffering of the victim is acknowledged to
gain credibility and influence bargaining during negotiations. In an
explanationapology the apologizer excuses behaviour without accepting
any wrongdoing. Aformalisticapology is offered without remorse under
the demand and pressure of an authority figure. In a happy-ending
apology the apologizer accepts responsibility and expresses remorse for
[his or her] actions. 132
129. Cayley, supranote 78 at 230.
130. O.C. Farrell & John Friedrich, "The Fall of Michael Milken" in Al Gini, ed. Case Studies in
Business Ethics, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2005) at 189.
131. "Enron Law Firm Seeks $700m" BBC news (22 November 2007) online, <http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/business/710733 1.stm>.
132. Described in Ontario, Cornwall Public Inquiry, A 71me for Apologies: The Legal and Ethical
Implications of Apologies in Civil Cases by Leslie H. MacLeod, ed. (Cornwall, ON: Cornwall Public
Inquiry, 2007) at 4, (Phase 2 Draft Paper), online: <comwallinquiry.ca/en/ healing/research/pdf/
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To return to the Enron case, Andrew Fastow's expressions of remorse
and shame could be characterized as "tactical" in that they were an
acknowledged requirement of the plea bargain; more than an "explanation"
in that he apparently accepted that what he had done was wrong; and
less than "formalistic" in that although offered "under the demand and
pressure" of the authorities, his words did include a statement of remorse.
Only Fastow himself would know whether a "happy-ending" apology had
also been achieved.
But other white-collar offenders may offer no apologies at all. At his
sentencing hearing, Conrad Black expressed his regret over the turn of
events at Hollinger, but he did not attribute the financial and other losses
to his own actions in the case. What he said to the court at sentencing
was, "I do wish to express very profound regret and sadness at the severe
hardship inflicted upon all of the shareholders, including a great many
employees, by the evaporation of $1.85 billion of shareholder value under
my successors."' 33 Jeffrey Skilling, when offered a chance to make an
apology under oath for the damage Enron's implosion had done, also
turned down the opportunity; instead
he remained defiant, casting himself, alternately, as both a New Economy
hero and a victim of events beyond his control. "We were making the
world better," he boasted at his Houston trial before pointing a finger at
The Wall Street Journaland its influential reporting for fuelling
a market
34
panic that ended with the energy giant's seismic collapse.
Black and Skilling, of course, were defending themselves against
accusations of criminal fraud rather than being in a position to apologize
free of coercion.
Macleod has described public apologies as a "growth phenomenon,"
issued by high profile individuals, commercial ventures, religious
institutions, governments, and politicians.'3 5 Following the trend of
legislation in both the United States and Australia, British Columbia and
then Saskatchewan, Yukon, and Manitoba have passed Apology Acts,'36
the purpose of which is to make it easier in the event of a conflict for
one party to apologize to another without having to admit legal liability.
In Manitoba, the Act was introduced in 2007 as a private member's bill

133. Quoted in "Partial Statement Made in Court by Conrad Black prior to his Sentencing" Canadian
Press (10 December 2007), online: <http://www.princegeorgecitizen.com 20071210107783/ wire/
business/partial-statement-made-in-court-by-conrad-black-black-prior-to-his-sentencing.htm>.
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135. Macleod, supra note 132 at 13-14.
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to allow health-care workers "to admit errors and keep communications
open," as well as "enabl[ing] patients and families to better understand the
situation in which an error occurred and receive closure.' 1 37 The broaderbased 2006 B.C. Act gives room for both individuals and public agencies
to apologize to one another:
This act will ...
allow individuals to apologize to one another, promoting
forgiveness and the re-establishment of relationships. A simple, sincere
apology is often the key to avoiding a long and bitter and costly dispute.
Apologies help to build public confidence in the administration of
justice, and they build stronger communities by allowing people to be
civil, to address wrongs and to move on with their lives. The Apology
Act encourages the moral and humane behaviour of apologizing for
wrongdoings and promotes open and direct dialogue between persons
in conflict.' 38
But these possibilities are limited when white-collar offences are treated
solely as criminal ones. The state-sanctioned stigmatization which results
can destroy remnants of "moral and humane behaviour" such as loyalty,
camaraderie, and shared sense of loss among victims, and replace them
with a primal desire for revenge. And "revenge," Villa-Vicencio notes,
"both in its naked form as well as in its emeliorated version as 'judicial
retribution,' as a response to abuse or loss, is both understandable and
probably necessary."' 39
In the New Zealand Family Group Conferences which provided an
early model for many other restorative practices, the family of the offender,
here considered among the secondary victims, "is encouraged to take the
lead in proposing a solution" to the harm done by his or her offence. 40
Braithwaite notes that in a restorative process, "the presence and support
of those who care most for us structures reintegration into the ritual."'' In
criminal prosecutions, however, the family members of the offender not
only are not encouraged to play a lead role but are almost entirely excluded
from the process. They may attend a trial to offer personal or "public
relations" support, but there is little space available for them at any point
to play a reintegrative role. The testimony they might offer on behalf of
their spouse or parent or child, in explanation of the circumstances of the

137. "Apology Act Passes in Manitoba Legislature" Manitoba News Release (8 November 2007)
<http://news.gov.mb.ca/chc/press/top/2007/11/2007-11-08-165100-2608.html>.
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February 2006) at 2496 (Lorne Mayencourt).
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crime or towards mitigation of the harm that has been done, is reduced to
the text of their "character letters" and noted only in the sentencing phase
of a trial. Otherwise family members are passive presences, under the
media spotlight in high-profile cases. Whether upon hearing their loved
one sentenced to jail they sit expressionlessly, like Barbara Amiel Black,'42
or sob quietly, like Rebecca Skilling, 143 the chance for supportive family
members to contribute to a restorative solution, or to receive any restorative
compassion themselves, is absent from the formal proceedings.
V. Corporatecrime and restoration
Russell and Gilbert have adapted Friedrich's distinction between whitecollar and corporate crime to produce the following definition for the
latter:
Corporate crimes are actions by corporate persons that create avoidable
harms to persons or property that involve a violation of private or
public trust. These corporate actions are intended to provide financial
advantage to the corporate person (i.e., the chartered organization
and its management hierarchy) or maintain or extend its power and
privilege.'"
While there are natural impediments to the application of a restorative
approach to white-collar crime, corporate crime and restorative justice
strike me as having a natural affinity. First of all, corporations-with
their "bottom line" motivation and operating under the "24-7" spotlight
that mainstream media, "I-reporters," and the Interet now provide' 4 5 have every reason to maintain trust and right relation with their specific
consumer bases and with the societies that contain and enrich them. A
proactive approach to corporate social responsibility and the voluntary
imposition of high standards upon itself help business ward off costly
government intervention, and keep that particular social relationship
running smoothly. 4 6 Economic globalization, both in theory and in
practice, has led many corporations to the realization that over and
above the responsibilities that governments have to their citizens "they
[multinational enterprises] too have social responsibilities and a broader
142. "Conrad Black Sentenced to 78 months in jail" CBC News (10 December 2007), online: <http://
www.cbc.ca/canada/montreallstory/2007/12/1 0/conradsentence.html>.
143. Shaheen Pasha, "Skilling Gets 24 Years" CNN (24 October 2006), online: CNNMoney.com
<http://money.cnn.com/2006/10/23/news/newsmakers/skillingsentence/index.htm>.
144. Steve Russell & Michael J. Gilbert, "Truman's Revenge: Social Control and Corporate Crime"
(1999) 32 Crime, L. & Soc. Change 59 at 61.
145. Naomi Klein was one of the first to see the possibilities of the Internet for anti-corporate activists.
Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the BrandBullies (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000).
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role to play in society than maximizing shareholder wealth."'1 47 According
to Gini, the "moral responsibilities" of corporations have been the single
most discussed topic in the literature of business ethics over the last twenty
48
years. 1
Wexler observes that "[large corporations now possess the power
to control the lives of employees, customers, shareholders, and the
residents of the local communities in which they operate [such that] ...
a single corporate decision can irrevocably alter the lives of thousands
upon thousands of people.' 1 49 When such a corporate decision is made
malevolently, for whatever reason, the specific victims of corporate crime
can be those very same thousands upon thousands of people. Puri has
pointed out that there are a variety of policy mechanisms through which
societies can attempt to control corporate misconduct, including public
enforcement through the regulatory agencies and the criminal justice
system, and tort and contract law remedies through the civil justice
system. 50 But from the victims' perspective, "private enforcement is
insufficient to control corporate misconduct when those harmed are
unable to detect the harm, when the harm to each individual is relatively
small, or when the individuals do not have the financial means to bring a
private suit."'' These precise limitations, from a "private enforcement"
perspective, have been instrumental in the development and expansion of
class action litigation against corporations, such as the Enron shareholders'
lawsuit referred to above.
A "social contract" theory of corporate social responsibility is based
partly on the increase in power and scope of activity which characterizes
business today and the recognition that "legal solutions" to the misuse of
that power are inadequate:
If corporations are like social persons, requiring tacit agreements for their
operations, and have grown as powerful as entire nations, then not only
must they be responsible for following the minimum morality of the law,
but they are in the process, whether they like it or not, of establishing the
rules we live by.'52

147. Joyce S. Osland, "Broadening the Debate: The Pros and Cons of Globalization" (2003) 12 J.
Management Inquiry 137 at 149.
148. Gini, supranote 130 at 184.
149. Wexler, supra note 75 at 82.
150. Puri, supranote 33 at 613.
151. Ibid.
152. Wexler, supra note 75 at 83.

114

The Dalhousie Law Journal

I interpret "establishing the rules we live by" as an example of Christie's
"norm-clarification" discussed earlier,'53 one of the pedagogical opportunities which would be available in a restorative encounter involving a
corporate crime. Dating back to Braithwaite, a number of scholars have
commented on the appropriateness of restorative justice as an approach
to business crime. Partly this has been prompted by observations on the
general ineffectiveness (and cost) of mainstream criminal justice when
faced with "crimes of the powerful." Braithwaite reflected:
Some of us began to wonder whether we were wrong to see our mission as
making corporate crime enforcement more like street crime enforcement
through tougher sanctions. Instead we began to wonder whether street
crime enforcement might
be more effective if it were more like corporate
154
criminal enforcement.

But the restorative requirement of broad stakeholder inclusion also
suggests an affinity between restorative justice and "best practice"
response to corporate criminality. Braithwaite himself observed that the
inclusion of multiple stakeholders, in the context of corporate crime,
brings in competitors, regulators, and advocacy groups, for example, and
that the "effect of the resolution agreed upon often reach[es] far beyond
the immediate perpetrator and victim to regulate practices throughout the
industry."' 55
Barnard, discussing the potential role of Braithwaite's reintegrative
shaming in corporate sentencing, observes that "shame ... works wonders
in leading a corporation to shape up after its wrongdoing has been exposed
to public condemnation."' 56 Where a corporation, itself is the subject of a
criminal prosecution, what she calls the "corporate icon" provision of the
U.S. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines allows a sentencing judge to
compel the chief executive officer to appear in person before the court to
receive the corporation's sentence.'
Barnard suggests that the provision
does not go far enough. She would amend the Guidelines to require the
CEO to appear and in addition give the judge the option of summoning the
corporation's board of directors as well:
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Requiring the CEO to appear in all cases, including those in which the
corporation has denied responsibility, will ensure not only that every CEO
whose company has been found guilty of committing a crime will be
compelled to give personal attention to the behavior that gave rise to that
crime, but also that the community's need for some form of retributive
ceremony has been satisfied. Requiring the board of directors, as well
as the CEO, to appear at a corporation's sentencing is likely to achieve
two additional important results. It will personalize and thus drive home
to directors the reality of their fiduciary responsibilities. This will force
them to recognize that corporate misconduct is, ultimately, a reflection
of their choices and actions at the board level, and not merely the choices
and actions of company employees. Also, it will enhance the deterrent
impact of the corporation's sentence." 8
Barnard, who writes in the American context, points out that top corporate
executives "can be characterized as living in an exclusive small town" and
forming a "surprisingly small and close-knit community."' 159 These people

inhabit, therefore, a social community of family members, colleagues,
and peers where the good reputation of the business person and his or
her business is "socially embedded," to use Braithwaite's term. 16 The
prospect of losing respect in front of this "small town," Barnard argues,
acts as a powerful deterrent to crime, both generally and specifically.
And where crime has been committed, as Llewellyn and Howse pointed
out, "reintegration is needed as much for community as for individual
wrongdoers and victims ...because disintegration and fragmentation
weaken the community,"' 16' even the exclusive ranks of the business

community.
Barnard sees the shaming rituals for CEOs and board members described
above-she calls them the "icon" and the "woodshed proceedings"-as
fitting quite well into "a situation in which executives themselves are not
personally charged with a crime, but in which the companies they manage
have been found guilty of criminal activity,"' 62 that is, not white-collar but
rather corporatecrime as Russell and Gilbert defined it above. As to how
the restorative encounter might proceed, Barnard suggests the elements:
acknowledgement and explanation of the crime by the CEO and Board;
an expressed commitment to corporate social responsibility; and what
she calls "absolution and benediction," an identification of the company's
praiseworthy activities and expression of confidence in its future good
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
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corporate citizenship.'63 At the close of proceedings "the community"
would have had the chance both to express its own disapproval of the
corporate behaviour, and a chance to "decertify the offender as deviant"
16
and accept it back into the law-abiding business community as well.
Archibald has described Canada as "far advanced in simultaneously
implementing contrasting but complementary models of criminal justice
as participatory responses to the phenomenon of crime"; although much
coordination and integration remains to be done, we are, he says, "no
longer in the experimental stages of this hybrid system."' 65 As Roach
elaborates, "[t]he non-punitive model, however, is a true alternative. It
does not rely on punishment to control crime, it treats people fairly and as
responsible citizens but not by relying on adversarial adjudication, and it
seems to reconcile the interests of offenders, victims, and their communities
through restorative justice and crime prevention."' 66 But there are barriers
to using a restorative approach to white-collar crime in Canada, if for no
other practical reason than the fact that white-collar crime prosecutions in
Canada, by other than the provincial securities commissions, have been
rare: "the long line of corporate executives who are led away in handcuffs
in the United States (the so called 'perp walk') leaves the impression that
Canadians are lax in policing corporate crime in comparison.' 1 67 The
International Monetary Fund is blunt about Canadian practices: "criminal
enforcement [of financial crime] appears to be particularly weak."'1 68 The
recent Lacroix conviction in Quebec, which was brought to the attention
of the police by an internal "whistleblower," was treated by the province
as a victory for their securities regulators (and a reason why they should
continue to operate independently rather than being consolidated into one
national body).' 6 9 As to the police, in the wake of the Enron and World
Com scandals, and the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the United States, in
2003 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police created an Integrated Market
Enforcement Team (IMET) to tackle securities fraud. A 2007 review of
the IMET program found that even with 119 employees and a $30 million
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annual budget, charges had been filed in only one major case and four minor
70
ones, quite a contrast with the track record of the American equivalent.
Clearly, the jurisdiction which is more aggressive in investigating,
prosecuting, and punishing white-collar criminals is the United
States, both at the federal and at the state level, and in keeping with
the American "business ethics" focus on the behaviour of individuals
within organizations.' 7' For example, the "subprime mortgage crisis"
unrolling in 2008 has sparked a Federal Bureau of Investigation inquiry
focusing on accounting fraud, securitization of loans, and insider trading
at organizations representing various stages of the mortgage process. 72
Contrasting global jurisdictions in their varied notions of corporate social
responsibility, Davis, Whitman, and Zald assign the leading international
role to the United States for "setting the tone" in corporate governance
issues including transparency of financial operations and shareholder
protection.' 73 They note the obvious financial motivators for foreign firms
to list their shares in the United States, but point out that "the consequences
of not complying with American securities rules and regulations can be
dire ... the SEC [is] far more aggressive than home-country regulators in
' 74
its pursuit of fraud charges."'
There has been far more attention given by American judicial
authorities to the punitive and deterrent aspects of sentencing white-collar
criminals than to their rehabilitation and restoration with society. But
Weisburd, Waring, and Chayet argue that it is not certain that white-collar
criminals, with their supposedly "rational" approach to crime, will be
particularly influenced by a jurisdiction's punishment policies.17 These
authors examined the assumption that white-collar offenders, with their
high social status, have more to lose through the criminal process than do
"common" offenders and that the potential loss acts as a specific deterrent
for the former group. In a comparison of white-collar offenders who
did, and who did not, serve a prison term for their offence, they found
"little impact of prison on the long-term likelihood of reoffending. "176
170. Paul Waldie, "Report Lists Failings of RCMP Fraud Units" Globe and Mail (4 December 2007)
B4, although it would be a matter for speculation whether there simply is less fraud committed here in
Canada.
171. Schlegelmilch & Robertson, supra note 28.
172. Evan Perez, "FBI Opens Criminal Probes into Subprime Loans" Globe and Mail (30 January
2008) BI1.
173. Gerald F. David, Marina V.N. Whitman & Mayer N. Zald, "The Responsibility Paradox" (2008)
6 Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev. 31.
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Weisburd et aL also note the number of offenders who do not conform
to stereotypes of criminality: "conventional people who confront some
specific crisis or opportunity that leads them to cross the line temporarily
and commit crime." 17 7 For these offenders, traumatized by the criminal
process, "whatever specific deterrence is gained may be produced before
the imprisonment sanction is imposed.' 7 Corporations, however, may
respond more reliably to deterrence. As Puri describes it, "corporations are
more attuned than individuals to changes in substantive laws and sentencing
... [B]ecause corporations respond to such economic incentives, deterrence
79
should be the prime goal in sentencing criminal corporations."'
I am drawn to the conclusion that the kind of non-violent financial
crimes which lend themselves most promisingly to a restorative vision
are those involving corporate crime, that is, crimes in which the corporate
entity itself is the perpetrator. Of course corporate crime can often be laid
at the feet of rogue employees, agents, or representatives, and from both a
corporate and social perspective much might be gained by just ridding the
barrel of bad apples. Puri describes two approaches here:
The doctrine of respondeat superior, literally meaning, "'let the master
answer," was developed by some courts in the United States to address the
issue. This doctrine requires a corporation to be convicted of an offence
physically committed by any of its employees or agents, even if the
individual wrongdoer is a low-level employee with very little authority.
Other courts in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada have
taken a narrower approach by developing the "Identification Theory,"
according to which a corporation will only be convicted of a crime
when the criminal behavior was carried out by individuals who are the
'directing minds' of the corporations.'
Puri also points out that in Canada, "harmful corporate conduct that is
addressed through public enforcement mechanisms is increasingly labeled
as regulatory,"' 81 which has the effect of creating more escape valves for
corporate miscreants. The "corporate person" spotted in wrongdoing can
volunteer in advance of even a hint of prosecution to explain and apologize,
mitigate harm, and try to restore its good standing in the community. As
Braithwaite advises us in the corporate context, "most of the rules that
have the greatest effect on our lives are extremely local-the rules that
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regulate our family lives, workplaces and neighbourhoods,' 8' ' 2 and a smart
corporate person will address their. family, workplace, and neighbourhood
immediately.
Consider the case of Vancouver-based Lululemon Athletica.
Lululemon is a yogawear retailer which "aim[s] to create components
for people to live longer, healthier, more fun lives" and does not operate
out of stores but rather "store communities."' 8 3 In 2007, the company's
"seaweed" clothing, when tested by the New York Times, turned out not
to contain the seaweed whose health benefits the company used as a
marketing tactic. Upon being "outted" and having been brought to the
attention of the Canadian Competition Bureau, the company removed
the tags making the health claims.'84 A couple of weeks later, company
founder Chip Wilson and his wife announced a $10 million donation to a
charity-imagine 1day-which builds schools in Ethiopia.'85 With respect
to the three requirements of restorative justice discussed in this paper, all of
them could be considered to have been met. Facing public condemnation
although not criminal prosecution, Lululemon made what I would call
an "explanation" apology, in that the company countered with its own
test results and Mr. Wilson told the Times of his seaweed apparel, "If you
actually put it on and wear it, it is different from cotton ... That's my only
test of it.' 8 6 But the company, with the media watching, acted quickly to
withdraw the unsubstantiated claims in an effort to restore their reputation
and brand image (which were agreed later to have been "bruised" by the
scandal).' 7 And in a press release the Competition Bureau made its own
"absolution and benediction": "We are pleased that Lululemon chose to
rectify the situation in a timely manner."' 8
Conclusion
Theorists-and practitioners-of restorative justice acknowledge that
there are situations in which a restorative approach is undesirable or
impossible. Mika et al. observe, "[r]estorative justice is a way of thinking
182. John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2000) at 3.
183. Lululemon, "Welcome to Lululemon Athletica" and "Ambassadors," online: <www.lululemon.
Com>.
184. "Competition bureau asks Lululemon to Remove Healthful Claims from Seaweed Products"
CanadianPress (16 November 2007) ["Competition bureau"].
185. Marina Strauss, "Lululemon Founder Aids Ethiopian Schools" Globe and Mail (7 December
2007) B2.
186. Bruce Constantineau, "Lululemon Weathering Seaweed Scandal" Vancouver Sun (14 November
2007).
187. Hollie Shaw, "Lululemon Headed For Fall: Analyst" FinancialPost (23 January 2008).
188. "Competition bureau," supra note 184.
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and it is something that can be very powerful ...
but it is not for everybody.
It is not for every victim. It is not for every offender."' 8 9 An offender,
a community, or a victim may be unwilling or unable to participate
restoratively. Gehm acknowledges that "the question of what to do in
the case of the unrepentant sinner, the unremorseful offender, remains an
open one."' 9° Others caution against a tendency to idealize "community":
"Only rarely do we recognize that some communities can be exclusionary,
inflexible, parochial, vengeful or discriminatory."' 9' A specific concern
expressed by women's groups in Canada has been that "restorative
justice will reproduce many of the inequalities of the current adversarial
process,"' 92 and the theory of transformative justice "emphasizes the
dangers of restoring relationships that were unjust to begin with."' 193 One
could also raise questions about the inequalities of the marketplace and the
disparate power that exists between corporations and individual victims of
corporate crime. Finally, there is a consistent concern in the literature on
restorative justice that the process might "re-victimize" victims, through
coercing them to participate, to engage offenders, to forgive. Archibald
identifies this concern as one of the challenges of restorative justice: "to
find appropriate ways to render restorative process safe and secure ...
[for]
19 4
victims."'
apprehensive
There are also specific jurisdictions, the United States in particular,
where various sociopolitical barriers exist to restorative justice and could
block any attempt to approach corporate crime as well as street crime with
a restorative approach. Beale identifies three current barriers: first, the
market-driven media, its focus on crime, and the anxiety about public.
safety which it triggers; second, the political rewards available to those
who "play the 'crime card'; and third, sentencing reforms which focus
on the uniform and proportionate treatment of an offender rather than the
harm to all stakeholders which he or she has caused. 195 At this point in
time, in the United States, it would appear that a major seismic event in
the prevailing public mindset would be required to realign the entrenched
sociopolitical barriers.
Braithwaite would take restorative justice out of the exclusive
possession of the criminal law and use its potential to "turn the private
189. Harry Mika et al., A Listening Project: Taking Victims and Their Advocates Seriously
(Harrisonburg, VA: Institute for Justice and Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University, 2002).
190. Gebm in Johnstone, supranote 79 at 281.
191. Cooley, Restorative Justice,supra note 63 at 14.
192. Ibid. at 15.
193. Braithwaite, "Narrative," supranote 67 at 426.
194. Archibald, supranote 121 at 242.
195. Beale, supra note 5.
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troubles of victims into public issues.""'96 Why not mobilize that potential
on behalf of'the victims of corporate crime? Restorative justice offers
the possibility of creating a new "narrative" about crime co-authored by a
plurality of stakeholders in an injustice,'97 and the "stakeholder" approach
to corporate management-although not without controversy-has grown
roots and developed political momentum. According to Braithwaite, a
"political objective of restorative justice is to persuade harsher elements in
the victims' rights movement that this [restorative] path to victim vindication
is more meaningful, satisfying, and just than punitive excess."' 98 Perhaps
the harsher critics of corporate malfeasance could also be persuaded. With
an increasing number of prosecutions occurring in multiple jurisdictions
in the areas of white-collar and corporate crime, only the passage of time
will allow the determination to be made as to where, at what pace, and
how such restorative justice initiatives might emerge.
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